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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Plaintiffs, Laurel Gardens, LLC (“LG”), American 
Winter Services, LLC (“AWS”), Laurel Garden Holdings, LLC 
(“LGH”), LGSM, GP (“LGSM”), and Charles P. Gaudioso, 
appeal from the order of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting the motion for entry of 
final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(b) filed by Defendants, Don Isken, Paul Isken, and Isken 
Enterprises, LLC (“IE”) (“the Isken Defendants”).  Specifically, 
the District Court designated its prior order—granting the Isken 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) while denying 
all but one of the motions to dismiss filed by the other 
defendants—as its final judgment as to the Isken Defendants.  
Plaintiffs argue that the District Court erred by applying the 
traditional requirements for personal jurisdiction as opposed to a 
specific provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“RICO”) authorizing the nation-wide 
exercise of personal jurisdiction in certain circumstances.   
 
Initially, we conclude that the issue of personal 
jurisdiction is properly before us and accordingly limit our 
ruling to this threshold jurisdictional issue.  We agree with 
Plaintiffs that 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) (and not 18 U.S.C. §1965(d)) 
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governs the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case and that 
they satisfy the statutory (and constitutional) requirements for 
the District Court to exercise such jurisdiction over the Isken 
Defendants.  In turn, Plaintiffs’ state law claims fall under the 
doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction.  Accordingly, we will 
vacate the order entered by the District Court disposing of the 
parties’ dismissal motions to the extent that it granted the Isken 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 
under Rule 12(b)(2) as well as the District Court’s Rule 54(b) 
order insofar as it designated this prior order as the final 




 Naming a total of thirty-three defendants, Plaintiffs 
alleged in their lengthy amended complaint that “[t]he primary 
cause of this action is a widespread criminal enterprise engaged 
in a pattern of racketeering activity across State lines, and a 
conspiracy to engage in racketeering activity involving 
numerous RICO predicate acts during the past ten (10) calendar 
years.”  (JA70.)  Plaintiffs alleged predicate acts of bribery, 
extortionate credit transactions, mail fraud, wire fraud, witness 
tampering, and retaliation.  They then set forth three separate 
RICO claims, i.e., conduct and participation in an enterprise 
through a pattern of racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), 
acquisition and maintenance of an interest in and control of an 
enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 1972(b), and conspiracy to engage in a pattern of 
racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).  
Finally, the pleading included claims against all defendants 
under Pennsylvania law for aiding and abetting the breach of 
fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, fraud, conversion, negligent 
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misrepresentation, and tortious interference with contract and 
prospective contractual arrangements (as well as a claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty against Defendants Timothy McKenna 
and Michael McKenna).    
 
According to Plaintiffs,1 the enterprise’s primary 
objective has been to inflict severe economic hardship upon the 
Plaintiffs with the intent to impair, obstruct, prevent, and 
discourage them from continuing to work in the field of 
landscaping and snow removal services.  “[A]t the center of 
[the] criminal enterprise” are Defendants Timothy McKenna and 
Michael McKenna.  (JA77.)  Timothy McKenna (a resident of 
Delaware who maintains a business address in Delaware) was 
the managing member of LG and AWS until May 2012 (when 
he was replaced by Gaudioso) and remained a consultant for 
Plaintiffs until his termination for cause in June 2014.  Likewise, 
Michael McKenna (Timothy McKenna’s son and a Pennsylvania 
resident who maintains a Delaware business address) was the 
general manager for LG and AWS until he resigned on 
November 9, 2014.  “Timothy McKenna, Michael McKenna, 
Catherine McKenna (Timothy’s wife), and [Defendant] MAT 
Site Management, LLC (the McKennas’ business) sought to 
steal the Plaintiffs’ customers and continue in the business of 
servicing the commercial landscaping and snow removal needs 
                                                 
1 The amended complaint alleged that LG and AWS are 
Pennsylvania limited liability companies while LGSM is a 
Pennsylvania limited liability partnership.  The three entities 
maintain their principal places of business, owned property, and 
conducted business in Pennsylvania.  LGH is a Delaware limited 
liability company with its principal place of business located in 
Pennsylvania.  
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for those customers.”  (Appellants’ Brief at 5-6 (citing JA70).)   
 
It is undisputed that brothers Don Isken and Paul Isken 
are residents of the State of Delaware and that IE is a Delaware 
limited liability company with its principal place of business 
located in Newark, Delaware.2  The first amended complaint 
included the following allegations against the Isken Defendants: 
 
Isken and Isken Enterprises 
 
134.  DON ISKEN and PAUL ISKEN 
have been associated with TIMOTHY 
McKENNA for several years.  They own several 
local hotels, specifically the Homewood Suites, 
Holiday Inn Express, and Comfort Inn in 
Wilmington, DE.  
  
135.  TIMOTHY McKENNA conspired 
with DON ISKEN and PAUL ISKEN to steal 
Company assets and labor by delivering loads of 
salt and calcium at no charge to the ISKEN’ [sic] 
hotels in return for some debt relief to TIMOTHY 
McKENNA.  This was late in the 2014 season 
when salt and melt products were generally 
unavailable at any price and the Company’s 
inventory was stretched.  TIMOTHY McKENNA 
and MICHAEL McKENNA also directed snow 
                                                 
2 The amended complaint alleged that IE “is a limited 
partnership under the laws of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania” maintaining a business address in Newark, 
Delaware.  (JA74.) 
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removal services to the hotels and DON ISKEN’ 
[sic] home with no intention of billing DON 
ISKEN.  When the Company learned of this, the 
Company sent a bill and attempted to collect 
payment from DON ISKEN and PAUL ISKEN.  
DON ISKEN and PAUL ISKEN refused to pay 
advising GAUDIOSO, ‘Our deal was with Tim 
McKenna”.  When GAUDIOSO pressed as to 
what that meant, neither DON ISKEN nor PAUL 
ISKEN would explain. 
 
136. Having loaned TIMOTHY 
McKENNA a significant amount of money 
(upwards of $200,000) and TIMOTHY 
McKENNA being unable to pay it back, DON 
ISKEN has initiated several Sherriff Goods and 
Chattel sales on TIMOTHY McKENNA’s home. 
 The email trail between TIMOTHY McKENNA 
and DON ISKEN goes back years and shows 
TIMOTHY McKENNA promising to pay DON 
ISKEN and always reneging on payment.  
Ultimately, DON ISKEN initiated the Sherriff 
sale and then TIMOTHY McKENNA somehow 
came up with an amount to get DON ISKEN off 
his back for a short time.  Then the process started 
again. 
 
137.  Counsel for the Company, 
SNYDER and FALCONE of SAUL EWING 
were advising TIMOTHY McKENNA on how to 
handle this situation with ISKEN. 
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(JA95-JA96.)3  Plaintiffs attached several exhibits to their 
pleading, including an exhibit consisting of documents 
purportedly relating to the Isken Defendants.  These  documents 
are:  (1) an April 28, 2014 e-mail from Don Isken to Timothy 
McKenna indicating that Timothy McKenna intended to have 
his partner in the salt business make a wire transfer in the 
amount of $103,750 “to each Paul and I” within the next two 
days, forwarding wiring instructions from Paul Isken, and 
expressing frustration about the whole process (stating that the 
amount would only increase and specifically pointing to earlier 
e-mails in which Timothy McKenna had assured Don Isken that 
payment was forthcoming) (JA293); (2) a May 2, 2014 e-mail 
from Don Isken to Timothy McKenna stating that he received a 
payment of $20,000 instead of the $207,000 he had long 
expected and Timothy McKenna had absolutely guaranteed he 
would receive, refusing to accept payment, and indicating that 
he had no intention to halt the judicial actions (and in particular 
that he intended to push for a judicial sale of Timothy 
McKenna’s personal belongings at the earliest opportunity); (3) 
an April 15, 2014 invoice from AWS billing Homewood Suites 
$12,874 for services related to snow removal, including $10,000 
for calcium; and (4) a June 5, 2014 e-mail from Don Isken to 
Timothy McKenna replying to an e-mail forwarded by Timothy 
McKenna from Defendant Christopher Wright, inquiring why 
                                                 
3 The amended complaint referred to Plaintiffs as “the 
Company.”  Defendant Saul Ewing, LP “is a Pennsylvania 
limited partnership engaged in the practice of law with a 
principal place of business” located in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, while Defendants David Falcone and John Snyder 
are engaged in the practice of law at the law firm’s office.  
(JA76.)      
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the Wright e-mail message4 was sent to him and “[w]hat am I 
supposed to do with this information and documentation—
deposit it in the bank” (JA296).   
 
 Fifteen separate motions to dismiss were filed by the 
respective defendants.  In fact, all but one of the defendants 
(Mary Tresize) moved to dismiss.  On May 15, 2017, the Isken 
Defendants moved to dismiss with prejudice pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(2) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  In their 
memorandum of law, they argued that the District Court must 
dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) because it lacks 
personal jurisdiction over Paul Isken and IE.  Under 
Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute providing for personal 
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the fullest extent 
allowed under the United States Constitution, see 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 5322, the amended complaint purportedly fails to 
allege either general or specific jurisdiction over Paul Isken and 
IE.  The Isken Defendants further sought dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6) on the grounds that the pleading does not assert a claim 
against the Isken Defendants upon which relief may be granted, 
the state law claims are outside the statute of limitations, and the 
claims are alleged against improper parties.  On June 16, 2017, 
Plaintiffs filed a lengthy omnibus response in opposition to 
several motions to dismiss, including the Isken Defendants’ own 
motion.  In their June 23, 2017 reply brief, the Isken Defendants 
acknowledged that the Plaintiffs’ opposition had responded to 
                                                 
4 The Wright e-mail was entitled “MJL Salt Deal 
Summary” and asked Timothy McKenna not to share the 
attached documents with anyone because the GSC cost per ton 
and some of the other small variables had yet to be adjusted.  
(JA296.)   
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two of their grounds for dismissal (failure to state a claim and 
statute of limitations).  They then addressed the merits of these 
two grounds.  However, the Isken Defendants also pointed out 
that “Plaintiffs do not respond to the Isken Defendants’ 
arguments for dismissal based on the lack of personal 
jurisdiction and the naming of an improper party.”  (E.D. Pa. 
Docket Entry #97 at 2.)  “Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(c), these 
arguments are unopposed, and the [first amended complaint] 
should be dismissed by the Court on that basis.”  (Id. (citing 
Dennis v. DeJong, 867 F. Supp. 2d 588, 622 (E.D. Pa. 2011); 
Toth v. Bristol Twp., 215 F. Supp. 2d 595, 598 (E.D. Pa. 2002); 
Smith v. Nat’l Flood Ins. Program of FEMA, 156 F Supp. 2d 
520, 525 (E.D. Pa. 2001)).)   
 
 On July 14, 2017, Plaintiffs submitted a motion for leave 
to file a sur-reply in further opposition to the Isken Defendants’ 
motion to dismiss.  Noting that most defendants had filed nearly 
identical motions to dismiss, “Plaintiffs do not intend to waste 
this Court’s time by repeating its own arguments in a surreply, 
but does seek leave to briefly address the Isken Defendants’ 
argument that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 
Defendants Paul Isken and [IE].”  (E.D. Pa. Docket Entry #108 
at 2.)  “Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court exercise its 
discretion and grant leave to file a surreply to clarify the record 
and respond to Defendants’ jurisdictional arguments.”  (Id.) 
 
 The District Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for leave on 
July 19, 2017, and the sur-reply was filed on the same day.  In 
addition to responding to the Isken Defendants’ argument that 
the first amended complaint should be dismissed because of 
Plaintiffs failure to respond on the issue of personal jurisdiction, 
Plaintiffs argued that the District Court possesses both general 
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and specific jurisdiction over Paul Isken and IE (and also 
asserted that the affidavits submitted by Paul Isken and Don 
Isken falsely state that IE has never owned or held any interest 
in any real property in Pennsylvania).  They also argued that the 
District Court has personal jurisdiction pursuant to the RICO 
statute as well as the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction.   
 
 On March 14, 2018, the District Court disposed of the 
various dismissal motions.  All of them were denied with two 
exceptions, namely, the respective motions to dismiss filed by 
Defendant MJL Enterprises (“MJL”) and the Isken Defendants.  
The District Court expressed concern that the lengthy pleading 
violates the requirement to set forth “a short and plain statement 
of the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), noting that its “302 pages 
(337 paragraphs with attached exhibits) include[ed] a mass of 
details which may be relevant and appropriate at summary 
judgment or trial, but are clearly surplusage in stating a claim at 
this stage” (JA18).  However, it found “Plaintiffs’ claims 
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge.”  (Id.)  “Defendant MJL 
moves to dismiss arguing venue is improper here because the 
terms of the settlement agreement between MJL and Laurel 
Gardens expressly provides each of the Parties involved in the 
agreement (MJL and Laurel Gardens) consents to jurisdiction in 
the Eastern District of Virginia.”  (Id. (citing E.D. Pa. Docket 
Entry #60).)  While concluding that venue is proper under 28 
U.S.C. § 1391, the District Court transferred the claims against 
MJL to the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404.  Finally, the District 
Court agreed with the Isken Defendants that it lacks both 
specific and general jurisdiction over them.  It looked to 
Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s contacts test.  “Applying the above principles, 
  12 
this Court concludes the Iskens lack the requisite ‘minimum 
contacts’ with Pennsylvania to the exercise of jurisdiction over 
them.  Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1124 (2014).  
Therefore, this Court lacks specific jurisdiction.”  (JA22.)  The 
District Court also found that the Isken Defendants also do not 
possess the continuous and systematic contacts with the forum 
state required for the exercise of general jurisdiction.  
“Accordingly, the Iskens’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) is granted.  The Iskens 
are dismissed from this matter.”  (JA23.) 
 
 On May 17, 2018, the Isken Defendants moved for entry 
of final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b).  The District Court 
granted this motion on November 20, 2018, determining that 
“the Order is a final judgment as to Defendants Don Isken, Paul 
Isken, and Isken Enterprises, LLC for the purposes of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), and no just cause exists for 
delaying entry of final judgment in this matter as to Defendants 




In addition to some disagreement as to what issues are 
properly before us, this appeal implicates a question of first 
impression for this Court, namely, whether 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) 
or 18 U.S.C. §1965(d) governs the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction in this case.5  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k) 
                                                 
5 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the RICO claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and over the state 
law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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sets forth the “Territorial Limits of Effective Service” and 
provides that “(1) [i]n general.  Serving a summons or filing a 
waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant:  (A) who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of 
general jurisdiction in the state where the district is located.”  
This subsection implicates the traditional contacts-based 
approach to personal jurisdiction, and it was this traditional 
approach that the District Court applied.  However, Rule 
4(k)(1)(C) includes an alternative:  serving a summons or filing 
a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant “when authorized by a federal statute.”  RICO 
includes a specific provision entitled “Venue and Process,” 
which states: 
 
(a)  Any civil action or proceeding under this 
chapter against any person may be instituted in 
the district court of the United States for any 
district in which such person resides, is found, has 
                                                                                                             
 
 Whether personal jurisdiction may be exercised over an 
out-of-state defendant poses a question of law triggering a 
plenary standard of review.  See, e.g., Metcalfe v. Renaissance 
Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2009).  “Although the 
plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the facts that 
establish personal jurisdiction, see Mellon Bank (East) PSFS 
Nat’l Ass’n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992), in 
reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), we ‘must 
accept all of the plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe 
disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.’  Carteret Sav. Bank, FA 
v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 142 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992).”  Pinker v. 
Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002).     
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an agent, or transacts his affairs. 
 
(b)  In any action under section 1964 of this 
chapter in any district court of the United States in 
which it is shown that the ends of justice require 
that other parties residing in any other district be 
brought before the court, the court may cause 
such parties to be summoned, and process for that 
purpose may be served in any judicial district of 
the United States by the marshal thereof. 
 
(c)  In any civil or criminal action or proceeding 
instituted by the United States under this chapter 
in the district court of the United States for any 
judicial district, subpenas [sic] issued by such 
court to compel the attendance of witnesses may 
be served in any other judicial district, except that 
in any civil action or proceeding no such 
subpoena [sic] shall be issued for service upon 
any individual who resides in another district at a 
place more than one hundred miles from the place 
at which such court is held without approval 
given by a judge of such court upon a showing of 
good cause. 
 
(d)  All other process in any action or proceeding 
under this chapter may be served on any person in 
any judicial district in which such person resides, 
is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1965.  We conclude that subsection (b) (and not 
subsection (d)) applies here.  In turn, Plaintiffs satisfy the 
  15 
statutory (and constitutional) requirements for the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over the Isken Defendants.  Furthermore, 
Plaintiffs’ state law claims then fall under the doctrine of 
pendent personal jurisdiction.      
 
A. The Issues on Appeal 
 
 Initially, the parties disagree over the issue or issues that 
are properly before us on this appeal.  On the one hand, the 
Isken Defendants insist that Plaintiffs waived the issue of 
personal jurisdiction under RICO by not raising this statutory 
issue before their sur-reply.  Instead of responding to Plaintiffs’ 
§ 1965 arguments, the Isken Defendants go on to argue at some 
length that the RICO claims fail as a matter of law and that 
“therefore the District Court has no personal jurisdiction over 
the Isken Defendants.”  (Appellees’ Brief at 4 (“Absent the 
RICO claims, subject matter jurisdiction for the district court 
over nonfederal claims is lost – making personal jurisdiction a 
moot question, as under [Plaintiffs’] argument, personal 
jurisdiction only obtains in this case under 18 U.S.C. § 1965.”).) 
 They also contend that the state law claims are legally deficient 
and barred by the statute of limitations and that IE is not a 
proper defendant.  On the other hand, Plaintiffs contend that this 
Court lacks the jurisdiction to consider the substantive issues 
raised by the Isken Defendants’ appellate brief because they 
were never addressed by the District Court and, in any event, no 
notice of cross-appeal was ever filed.  With respect to the merits 
of these substantive issues, Plaintiffs “will simply refer to and 
incorporate by reference their Omnibus Response in the district 
court, which addressed the Isken Defendants’ and many other 
defendants’ substantive arguments” (and they request leave to 
file a full brief addressing the substantive issues if the Court 
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were to entertain them).    (Appellants’ Reply Brief at 6 and 8 
(citing E.D. Pa. Docket Entry #91).) 
 
 We agree with Plaintiffs that the issue of personal 
jurisdiction under the RICO provision is properly before us.  
Under the circumstances, we also limit our ruling to this 
threshold jurisdictional issue under Rule 12(b)(2) and therefore 
refrain from considering whether Plaintiffs fail to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).    
 
 It is well established that, in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances, this Court will not consider issues raised for the 
first time on appeal.  See, e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust 
Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 261-62 (3d Cir. 2009).  “For an issue to be 
preserved for appeal, a party ‘must unequivocally put its 
position before the trial court at a point and in a manner that 
permits the court to consider its merits.’”  Id. at 262 (quoting 
Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 182 F.3d 212, 218 (3d 
Cir. 1999)).   
 
Plaintiffs did not address the question of personal 
jurisdiction—whether under the traditional contacts test or a 
specific federal statutory provision authorizing the nation-wide 
exercise of personal jurisdiction—until they moved for leave to 
file a sur-reply.  However, the District Court granted their 
motion and ordered Plaintiffs to file their sur-reply—which they 
did.  While the Isken Defendants assert that such filings are 
normally granted only when the preceding reply brief raises new 
matter or arguments and that they were deprived “of opportunity 
to further respond” (Appellees’ Brief at 13), the Isken 
Defendants did not oppose or otherwise object to Plaintiffs’ 
successful motion for leave to file the sur-reply.  Given the 
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months that passed between the authorized filing of the sur-reply 
to the motion to dismiss and the District Court’s disposition of 
the dismissal motion itself, the issue was clearly presented to the 
District Court at a point and in a manner to permit it (and the 
Isken Defendants) to consider its merits.  Unfortunately, the 
District Court’s dismissal order did not address the issue of 
personal jurisdiction under the RICO provision.  But this 
omission (like the Plaintiffs’ failure to address personal 
jurisdiction in their omnibus response) was evidently nothing 
more than an understandable oversight in a complicated case 
involving more than thirty defendants filing multiple (and often-
overlapping) motions to dismiss and where the Isken Defendants 
were the only parties to seek dismissal for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.  After all, the District Court did not (as the Isken 
Defendants appear to suggest) indicate that it was “dismissing 
the Isken Defendants based on lack of timely opposition to the 
Isken Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Local Rule of Civil 
Procedure 7.1(c)”6 (id. at 12).  On the contrary, the District 
Court considered the Isken Defendants’ arguments about the 
lack of general and specific jurisdiction and determined that they 
do not possess the requisite contacts with the forum state for 
jurisdiction on such grounds.  It did so even though the Isken 
Defendants had pointed out in their reply brief that the 
Plaintiffs’ omnibus response did not respond to their arguments 
about general and specific jurisdiction and asked the District 
Court to dismiss the first amended complaint as uncontested 
                                                 
6   Eastern District of Pennsylvania Local Rule 7.1(c) 
states that, “[i]n the absence of timely response, the motion may 
be granted as uncontested except as provided under Fed.R.Civ.P 
[sic] 56.” 
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pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(c).7  
 
 We likewise limit our ruling to this threshold issue of 
personal jurisdiction.   Generally, we may affirm on any ground 
supported by the record, and an appellee may urge affirmance on 
such a ground even if the district court overlooked it or it 
involves an attack on the district court’s reasoning.  See, e.g., 
TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2019); EF 
Operating Corp. v. Am. Buildings, 993 F.2d 1046, 1048 (3d Cir. 
1993).  However, the District Court granted the Isken 
Defendants’ motion under Rule 12(b)(2) for “lack of personal 
jurisdiction”—and not pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to 
state a claim a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  Cf, e.g., 
EF Operating, 993 F.2d at 1048-49 (distinguishing between 
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction and grant of summary 
judgment on merits and concluding that, where appellant files 
appeal from summary judgment, appellee must cross-appeal to 
                                                 
7 According to the Isken Defendants, Plaintiffs could 
have addressed the District Court’s dismissal of the Isken 
Defendants on personal jurisdiction grounds by filing a timely 
motion for reconsideration.  At least in retrospect, such a motion 
would have been an appropriate and efficient way to emphasize 
to the District Court—and obtain a ruling on—the issue of 
personal jurisdiction under the RICO provision before the case 
went forward against the other defendants (and the order was 
certified as a final judgment under Rule 54(b) as to the Isken 
Defendants).  However, the Isken Defendants do not indicate 
that such a motion is required for us to consider the issue of 
personal jurisdiction on appeal.  We also note that the Isken 
Defendants did not seek reconsideration of the order granting 
Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file the sur-reply.    
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contest denial of motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction).  In fact, the District Court denied the various Rule 
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss “referenced in the above Order,” 
finding that “Plaintiffs’ claims survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” 
 (JA18.)  At this stage: 
 
 [A]ccepting Plaintiffs’ lengthy allegations as 
true, this Court concludes that Plaintiffs raise a 
plausible right to relief.  Whether Plaintiffs have a 
claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary 
duty, civil conspiracy, RICO, fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duty, conversion, negligent 
misrepresentation, and tortious interference, is 
best decided on a full factual record of a Rule 56 
motion. 
 
(Id.) 8  We also do not overlook the procedural posture of 
Plaintiffs’ current appeal.  The District Court designated its 
interlocutory order as a final judgment as to the Isken 
Defendants pursuant to Rule 54(b).  In their successful Rule 
54(b) motion, the Isken Defendants acknowledged that 
“Plaintiffs’ claims against the remaining defendants are 
continuing, with written discovery scheduled to conclude on 
June 1, 2018.”  (E.D. Pa. Docket Entry #195-1 at 2 (citing E.D. 
                                                 
8  Transferring the MJL claims, the District Court 
observed that, “[b]ecause MJL and Laurel Gardens agreed to the 
Eastern District of Virginia as their forum, this Court does not 
address the merits of MJL’s motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim.”  (JA21.)  The District Court did not make this sort of 
statement in its discussion of the Isken Defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.   
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Pa. Docket Entry #158 at ¶ 1) (noting no trial date has been 
set).)  They emphasized the fact that they “were the only 
defendants dismissed in the action on the basis of personal 
jurisdiction, and the basis for their dismissal is factually unique 
to them.”  (Id. at 5.)  Under these circumstances, we limit 
ourselves to this “unique” basis.9      
 
B. Personal Jurisdiction under the RICO Provision 
 
 There is a circuit split regarding which specific 
subsection of the RICO provision governs the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction in this case.  Plaintiffs recognize that two 
circuits (the Fourth and the Eleventh Circuits) have looked to § 
1965(d).  According to the Eleventh Circuit, “Section 1965(d) of 
the RICO statute provides for service in any judicial district in 
which the defendant is found.”  Republic of Panama v. BCCI 
Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 942 (11th Cir. 1997).  
“When a federal statute provides for nationwide service of 
process, it becomes the statutory basis for personal jurisdiction.” 
 Id. (citing In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 835 F.2d 1341, 1344 
(11th Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 
Granfianciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Lisak v. 
Mercantile Bancorp Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987)).  
Citing Republic of Panama, the Fourth Circuit reached the same 
conclusion.  ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 
                                                 
9  Plaintiffs argue that the District Court erroneously 
dismissed the claims against Don Isken because he (unlike Paul 
Isken and IE) did not seek dismissal based on the absence of 
personal jurisdiction.  We do not address this argument because 
we determine that the District Court possesses personal 
jurisdiction over all three of the Isken Defendants. 
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626 (4th Cir. 1997).  Five circuits (the Second, Seventh, Ninth, 
Tenth, and D.C. Circuits) have stated that subsection (b) governs 
nation-wide service of process and personal jurisdiction over 
“other parties.”10  See FC Inv. Grp. v. IPX Markets, Ltd., 529 
F3d 1087, 1098-1100 (D.C. Cir. 2008) Cory v. Aztec Steel 
Bldg., Inc., 468 F.3d 1226, 1229-33 (10th Cir. 2006); PT United 
Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 70-72 (2d Cir. 
1998); Lisak, 834 F.2d at 671-72; Butcher’s Union Local No. 
498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 538-39 (9th Cir. 1986).   
 
We agree with the majority approach.  We do so based on 
the language and structure of the RICO provision itself as well 
as the relative absence of reasoning in support of the minority 
position.  The history of the legislation and our own prior case 
law provide further support for this majority approach.   
 
                                                 
10  We note that the Seventh Circuit has pointed (in 
passing) to subsection (d) as authorizing nation-wide service of 
process.  See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Funds v. 
Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 940-41 (7th Cir. 
2000); Robinson Eng’g Co. Pension Plan & Tr. v. George, 223 
F.3d 445, 449 & n.1 (7th Cir. 2000).  However, there are other 
Seventh Circuit decisions pointing to subsection (b) (including 
Lisak, which did address the statutory provision with a little 
more depth than either Central States or Robinson 
Engineering)).  See Lisak, 834 F.2d at 671-72; Stauffacher v. 
Bennett, 969 F.2d 4455, 460-61 (7th Cir. 1992), superseded by 
rule on other grounds as stated in Cent. States, 230 F.3d at 938.  
Robinson Engineering also cited to Stauffacher’s reference to 
subsection (b).  Robinson Eng’g, 223 F.3d at 449 (citing 
Stauffacher, 969 F.2d at 460-61).            
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 “The first federal appellate court to actually analyze § 
1965’s full text and offer reasoning for its choice of subsections 
was the Second Circuit” in PT United.  Cory, 468 F.3d at 1230 
(footnote omitted).  The Second Circuit persuasively explained 
the function of each subsection as part of a single coherent 
framework for RICO actions.  See, e.g., FC Inv., 529 F.3d at 
1099 (“Having considered the arguments of the parties, as well 
as the reasoning of our sister circuits on the question, we are 
persuaded to adopt the Second Circuit’s reasoning.”); Cory, 468 
F.3d at 1231 (“We find [the Second Circuit’s] reasoning 
persuasive and consistent with congressional intent.” (footnote 
omitted)).  Specifically: 
 
Section 1965 makes sense only if all of its 
subsections are read together.  Neither the district 
court’s opinion nor the briefing of the parties 
discusses § 1965(a) and (c), but we find these 
sections to be equally important to a coherent 
understanding of the meaning and functioning of 
the statute, particularly for the purpose of 
interpreting the terms “other parties” and “other 
process” in §§ 1965(b) and (d), respectively. 
 
 Reading all of the subsections of § 1965 
together, the court finds that § 1965 does not 
provide for nationwide jurisdiction over every 
defendant in every civil RICO case, no matter 
where the defendant is found.  First, § 1965(a) 
grants personal jurisdiction over an initial 
defendant in a civil RICO case to the district court 
for the district in which that person resides, has an 
agent, or transacts his or her affairs.  In other 
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words, a civil RICO action can only be brought in 
a district court where personal jurisdiction based 
on minimum contacts is established as to at least 
one defendant.   
 
 Second, § 1965(b) provides for nationwide 
service and jurisdiction over “other parties” not 
residing in the district, who may be additional 
defendants of any kind, including co-defendants, 
third-party defendants, or additional counter-
claim defendants.  This jurisdiction is not 
automatic but requires a showing that the “ends of 
justice” so require.  This is an unsurprising 
limitation.  There is no impediment to prosecution 
of a civil RICO action in a court foreign to some 
defendants if it is necessary, but the first 
preference, as set forth in § 1965(a), is to bring 
the action where suits are normally expected to be 
brought.  Congress has expressed a preference in 
§ 1965 to avoid, where possible, haling 
defendants into far flung fora. 
 
PT United, 138 F.3d at 71-72 (footnote omitted).  Going further, 
subsection (c) “simply refers to service of subpoenas on 
witnesses”—specifically in civil or criminal actions or 
proceedings instituted by the government.  Id.  Finally, 
“subsection (d)’s reference to ‘“all other process”’ must mean 
process different than a summons or a government subpoena, 
both of which are dealt with in previous subsections.”  Cory, 
468 F.3d at 1230 (quoting PT United, 138 F.3d at 72).  As the 
Second Circuit explained:   
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This interpretation, one which gives meaning to 
the word ‘other’ by reading sequentially to 
understand ‘other’ as meaning ‘different from that 
already stated in subsections (a)-(c),’ gives 
coherent effect to all sections of § 1965, and 
effectively provides for all eventualities without 
rendering any of the sections duplicative, without 
impeding RICO actions and without unnecessarily 
burdening parties. 
 
PT United, 138 F.3d at 72 (“We conclude that the natural 
reading given to § 1965(b) by the 9th Circuit in Butcher’s Union 
and the district court here was correct, and that this conclusion is 
borne out by a complete reading of the statute, a course of action 
which has not been followed by the courts that have read § 
1965(d) in isolation to reach the opposite conclusion.”). 
 
In contrast, the circuit courts adopting the minority 
approach did not offer a detailed explanation for their selection 
of subsection (d).  The Eleventh Circuit “did ‘not pause long 
over . . . the question,’ and oddly, it cited Lisak [which 
identified subsection (b) as creating personal jurisdiction] for 
support.”  Cory, 468 F.3d at 1230 (quoting Republic of Panama, 
119 F.3d at 942); see also, e.g., PT United, 138 F.3d at 70 
(“[A]nother circuit court stated in conclusory terms that § 
1965(d) provides for nationwide service of process.” (citing 
Republic of Panama, 119 F.3d at 942)).  Without mentioning 
subsection (b), the Fourth Circuit indicated that subsection (a) 
authorizes venue while subsection (d) authorizes service of 
process “evidencing Congress’ desire that ‘[p]rovision [be] 
made for nationwide venue and service of process.’”  ESAB 
Grp., 126 F.3d at 626 (quoting H. Rep. No. 91-1549, at 4 
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(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4010); see also, 
e.g., Cory, 468 F.3d at 1230 (noting that Fourth Circuit did not 
mention contrary position of Seventh and Ninth Circuits). 
  
In fact, the history of the RICO provision provides 
additional support for the majority approach.  In the report cited 
by the Fourth Circuit, the House Judiciary Committee stated that 
“[s]ubsection (b) provides nationwide service of process on 
parties, if the ends of justice require it, in actions under Section 
1964” while “[s]ubsection (d) provides that all other process in 
actions under the chapter may be served wherever the person 
resides, is found, has the agent, or transacts his affairs.”  1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4010 (further stating that subsection (a) 
establishes venue for civil proceedings while subsection (c) 
provides for nationwide subpoena power for witnesses in civil 
or criminal proceedings but requires good cause for issuance if 
witness in civil action resides in another district and at place 
more than 100 miles from court).  The committee further 
explained that “[S]ection 1965 contains broad provisions 
regarding venue and process, which are modeled on present 
antitrust legislation.”  Id.; see also, e.g., Cory, 468 F.3d at 1231 
(discussing committee report).  For instance, the Clayton Act 
provides that “[a]ny suit, action, or proceeding under the 
antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only in 
the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any 
district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all 
process in such cases may be served in the district of which it is 
an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.”  15 U.S.C. § 22.  
Like the RICO provision, the Clayton Act then authorizes “other 
parties” to be served if “the ends of justice” so require: 
 
The several district courts of the United States are 
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invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain 
violations of this Act, and it shall be the duty of 
the several United States attorneys, in their 
respective districts, under the direction of the 
Attorney General, to institute proceedings in 
equity to prevent and restrain such violations. . . . 
 Whenever it shall appear to the court before 
which any such proceeding may be pending that 
the ends of justice require that other parties 
should be brought before the court, the court may 
cause them to be summoned whether they reside 
in the district in which the court is held or not, 
and subpoenas to that end may be served in any 
district by the marshal thereof. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 25; accord 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 5 (Sherman Act); 15 
U.S.C. §§ 9, 10 (Wilson Tariff Act).  The Fourth Circuit 
appropriately turned to Justice Jackson’s summary of the 
antitrust statutory scheme in which he explained that, before 
“‘other parties’” may be properly served, “‘it must be made to 
appear to the court that the ends of justice require that they be 
brought before the court, in which case they may be summoned 
from any district.’”  Cory, 468 F.3d at 1231 (quoting United 
States v. Nat’l City Lines, 334 U.S. 573, 598 (1948) (Jackson, J., 
concurring in result), superseded by statute on other grounds as 
stated in Trotter v. 7R Holdings, 873 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2017)).   
 
Finally, we previously identified § 1965(b) as the 
subsection governing service of process and personal 
jurisdiction in this context.  In explaining why a venue provision 
applicable to civil forfeiture proceedings, see 18 U.S.C. § 
981(h), does not authorize nation-wide service of process (and 
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thereby would not permit the district court to exercise in rem 
jurisdiction where the res is located outside the district), we 
observed that Congress has recognized in other instances the 
utility of a specific provision authorizing nation-wide service of 
process.  United States v. Contents of Account No. 3034504504, 
971 F.2d 974, 982 (3d Cir. 1992).  We offered subsection (b) of 
the RICO statutory provision and the Sherman Act as examples 
of legislation expressly authorizing nation-wide service: 
 
Aside from the Commodity Exchange Act, 
Congress has expressly provided for nationwide 
service of process in the civil Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, see 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1965(b) (West 1984), the Securities 
Act of 1933, see 15 U.S.C.A. § 77v(a) (West 
Supp. 1992), the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa (West Supp. 1992), and 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 
see 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(e)(2) (West 1985).  See 
[United States v. 11205 McPherson Lane, 754 F. 
Supp. 1483, 1488 (D. Nev. 1991).]; see also Lea 
Brillmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal 
Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due 
Process, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, 1220 n.14 
(1992) (noting nationwide service of process 
provided for in Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 9 
(West 1970) and Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 5 
(West 1973); Howard M. Erichson, Note, 
Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal 
Question Cases:  A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1117, 1123 n.30 (1989) (listing another 
twelve nationwide statutes providing for 
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nationwide service of process). . . .  
 
Id.  Plaintiffs acknowledge that this Court “did not squarely 
address the question [now before us] and it was simply a passing 
reference in a string citation.”  (Appellants’ Brief at 19.)  
However, this reference, brief as it may be, should not be 
overlooked out of hand—especially where it is consistent with 
the statutory language and structure, the existing case law, and 
the history of the statutory provision at issue.          
 
 Accordingly, “[w]hen a civil RICO action is brought in a 
district court where personal jurisdiction can be established over 
at least one defendant, summonses can be served nationwide on 
other defendants if required by the ends of justice.”  Cory, 468 
F.3d at 1226.  Plaintiffs assert that there are two requirements 
that must be satisfied under subsection (b) “to establish personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant not meeting the minimum contacts 
requirements.”  (Appellants’ Brief at 23.)  According to 
Plaintiffs, these requirements are:  (1) “[a]t least one of the other 
defendants must meet the traditional personal jurisdiction 
requirements” (id. at 24); and (2) “[t]he ‘ends of justice’ must 
require that the district court in this case is the one in which this 
case should be tried” based on “the statutory language in Section 
1965(b), which courts have held to require ‘that there is no other 
district in which a court will have [traditional] personal 
jurisdiction over all of the alleged co-conspirators’” (id. 
(quoting Butcher’s Union, 788 F.2d at 539).   
 
The structure of § 1965 as well as the “other parties” 
language of subsection (b) clearly require the presence of at 
least one defendant that meets the traditional contacts test.  With 
the apparent exception of the Seventh Circuit, see Lisak, 834 
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F.3d at 671-72, the circuit courts following the majority 
approach have adopted this requirement.  See FC Inv., 529 F.3d 
at 1098-1100; Cory, 468 F.3d at 1229-33; PT United, 138 F.3d 
at 70-72; Butcher’s Union, 788 F.2d at 538-39.   
 
As Plaintiffs recognize, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
plaintiff must also establish that there is no other district court 
that would have traditional personal jurisdiction over all of the 
defendants.  Butcher’s Union, 788 F.3d at 53.  As the Seventh 
Circuit put it, “Section 1965(b) authorizes nationwide service so 
that at least one court will have jurisdiction over everyone 
connected with any RICO enterprise.”  Lisak, 834 F.3d at 672.  
“A district court in Indiana will have that jurisdiction whether or 
not Widmar can be brought before the court in Illinois, so 
perhaps the ends of justice do not ‘require’ his presence in this 
suit.”  Id.  We note, however, that the Tenth Circuit rejected the 
Butcher’s Union requirement, instead holding “that the ‘ends of 
justice’ analysis is not controlled by the fact that all defendants 
may be amendable to suit in one forum.”  Cory, 468 F.3d at 
1232.  The Cory court did not “offer a competing definition, as 
the ‘ends of justice’ is a flexible concept uniquely tailored to the 
facts of each case.”  Id.  “And in the current case, we have 
Cory’s assertion that the ends of justice require nationwide 
service simply because he has sustained damages and litigation 
costs in Kansas.  We conclude, as a matter of law, that such 
facts, standing alone, do not satisfy the ‘ends of justice’ 
standard.”  Id. (noting that plaintiff did not claim financial 
impediment to suit in defendants’ home state).  Furthermore, the 
Second and D.C. Circuits have refrained from deciding what the 
“ends of justice” require.  FC Inv., 529 F.3d at 1100 & n.14 
(refraining from opining on meaning of “ends of justice” 
language because district court lacked traditional personal 
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jurisdiction over sole defendant); PT United, 138 F.3d at 72 n.5 
(“As indicated, the statute does not specify what ‘the ends of 
justice’ are, but, as indicated, UCC does not challenge the 
district court’s finding that the ends of justice do not in this case 
require § 1965(b) jurisdiction over the individual defendants.  
The district court followed Butcher’s Union, 788 F.2d at 538-39, 
in finding ‘the ends of justice’ to refer to a case in which there is 
no district with personal jurisdiction over all defendants.  
Because the individual defendants work in Pennsylvania for 
Pennsylvania corporation Crown, the district court found that 
the ends of justice did not require personal jurisdiction over the 
individual defendants in New York under § 1965(b).”).  
Nevertheless, the parties in this case do not recognize this 
conflict.  We need not—and do not—decide whether the Ninth 
or the Tenth Circuit is correct because, as we explain below, 
Plaintiffs establish both that no other district would have 
traditional jurisdiction over all defendants and that the exercise 
of jurisdiction satisfies a flexible understanding of the “ends of 
justice.”11  
 
We are satisfied that Plaintiffs satisfy the statutory 
requirements—which the Isken Defendants themselves do not 
brief on appeal.  While alleging a multi-state scheme implicating 
several Delaware and New Jersey defendants (and one Virginia 
defendant (MJL)), Plaintiffs identify roughly half of the thirty-
three defendants as Pennsylvania residents or Pennsylvania 
entities with their respective places of business in Pennsylvania. 
                                                 
11 We likewise need not—and do not—decide whether a 
plaintiff must specifically allege “a multidistrict conspiracy” or 
“single nationwide RICO conspiracy” encompassing the 
defendants.  See, e.g., Butcher’s Union, 788 F.2d at 539.   
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 Except for the Isken Defendants, none of the defendants moved 
to dismiss on the grounds of a lack of personal jurisdiction (not 
even MJL, which did move on venue grounds).  As the District 
Court recognized in its venue discussion, “almost all other 
parties are Pennsylvania residents.”  (JA20.) “Plaintiffs’ 
allegations focus on a ‘hub-and-spoke conspiracy’ between the 
McKennas and all named Defendants against Plaintiffs” (JA19), 
and “[e]vents giving rise to this action – the hub-and-spoke 
conspiracy – are centered in Pennsylvania” (JA20).  
Specifically, “three of the four business-Plaintiffs [LG, AWS, 
and LGSM] are Pennsylvania entities (two LLCs and one 
general partnership), one [LGH] is a Delaware LLC, all have 
principal or registered places of business within Pennsylvania, 
and three [LG, AWS, and LGSM] conducted business within 
Pennsylvania.”  (Appellants’ Brief at 28 (citing JA70).)  In fact, 
the amended complaint alleged that, while Timothy McKenna is 
believed to be a resident of Delaware, his son (the other person 
at the alleged center of the conspiracy), Michael McKenna, is 
believed to be a Pennsylvania resident.  According to the 
Plaintiffs’ pleading, “TIMOTHY McKENNA and MICHAEL 
McKENNA also directed snow removal services to the [Isken 
Defendants’] hotels and DON ISKEN’ [sic] home with no 
intention of billing DON ISKEN.”  (JA95-JA96.)  Furthermore, 
“[c]ounsel for the Company, SNYDER and FALCONE of 
SAUL EWING were advising TIMOTHY MCKENNA on how 
to handle this situation with ISKEN.”  (JA96.)  Allegedly, Saul 
Ewing is a Pennsylvania limited partnership with its principal 
place of business located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, while 
Snyder and Falcone maintain their offices at that location.  
Considering this Pennsylvania focus, no other district court 
would have had traditional jurisdiction over all of the numerous 
defendants in this action.  Given the obvious proximity between 
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Delaware and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, “exercising 
personal jurisdiction over the Isken Defendants in this case does 
not compromise the Second Circuit’s recognition of Congress’s 
preference ‘to avoid, where possible, haling defendants into far 
flung fora.’”  (Appellants’ Brief at 29 (quoting PT United, 138 
F.3d at 72).)   In the end, Plaintiffs alleged that at least one 
Pennsylvanian is “at the center of a criminal enterprise” (JA77) 
targeting Pennsylvania plaintiffs and involving numerous other 
Pennsylvania defendants as well as several defendants from 
neighboring states.  Under the circumstances, the “ends of 
justice” call for the exercise of jurisdiction over the three out-of-
state Isken Defendants.  
 
“Where Congress has statutorily authorized nationwide 
service of process, such service establishes personal jurisdiction, 
provided that the federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction 
comports with Fifth Amendment due process.”  Cory, 468 F.3d 
at 1229 (citing Peay v. BellSouth Med. Assistance Plan, 205 
F.3d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000)); see also, e.g., In re 
Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 
297-99 (3d Cir. 2004); Pinker, 292 F.3d at 368-71.  Having 
determined that “the ends of justice require” the Isken 
Defendants “be brought before” the District Court under § 
1965(b), we have no difficulty concluding that the District 
Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over them comports 
with the Fifth Amendment.  In this context, we are not limited to 
the defendant’s contacts with the forum state and instead 
consider contacts with the nation as a whole.  See, e.g., 
Automotive Refinishing, 358 F.3d at 297-99; Pinker, 292 F.3d at 
368-71.  Don Isken and Paul Isken are both Delaware residents 
while IE is a Delaware limited liability company with its 
principal place of business in Newark, Delaware.  “Once 
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minimum contacts have been established, we assess whether the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”  Pinker, 292 F.3d at 
370 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 
(1945)) (noting, inter alia, existence of dispute not raised by 
parties as to whether fairness prong of analysis applies in 
context of federal statute authorizing nation-wide service of 
process and stating that we need not concern ourselves with 
propriety of litigating in district court at issue vis-à-vis other 
district courts); see also, e.g., ESAB Grp., 126 F.3d at 626-27; 
Republic of Panama, 119 F.3d at 942-48.  Unlike the traditional 
approach, this inquiry focuses less on federalism concerns and 
more on the national interest in furthering the policies of the 
federal statute at issue.  See, e.g., Pinker, 292 F.3d at 370.   
 
The District Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
defendants from a neighboring state does not offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.  “[W]e believe that 
the national interest in furthering the policies of the [federal 
anti-racketeering statute enabling a single district court to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over all defendants] militates in 
favor of exercising personal jurisdiction over [the Isken 
Defendants].”  Id. at 372; see also, e.g., ESAB Grp., 126 F.3d at 
627 (concluding that exercise of jurisdiction comported with 
Fifth Amendment because of absence of any evidence of such 
extreme inconvenience or unfairness as would outweigh 
congressionally articulated policy and that dictates of judicial 
efficiency did not so strongly weigh against forum that 
constitutional due process would be offended); Republic of 
Panama, 119 F.3d at 948 (finding that defendants failed to 
present compelling case that litigating action in forum would put 
them at severe disadvantage because defendants were large 
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corporations providing banking services to customers in major 
metropolitan areas along eastern seaboard, fact they may have 
no significant contact with Florida was insufficient to render 
forum state unreasonably inconvenient, necessity of world-wide 
discovery indicated that Florida was no more inconvenient than 
any other district, and defendants presented no evidence that 
ability to defend would be significantly compromised); Lisak, 
834 F.2d at 672 (“Section 1965(b) authorizes nationwide service 
so that at least one court will have jurisdiction over everyone 
connected with any RICO enterprise.”). 
 
C. Pendent Personal Jurisdiction 
 
 In addition to the RICO claims, Plaintiffs asserted several 
state law claims against the defendants (including the Isken 
Defendants).  We agree with Plaintiffs that the doctrine of 
pendent (or supplemental) personal jurisdiction applies in this 
case.  
  
This Court recognized the notion of pendent personal 
jurisdiction more than forty years ago in Robinson v. Penn 
Central Co., 484 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1973).  We explained: 
 
Analysis should begin, we think, with the 
fact that in the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Congress has 
bestowed upon the United States District Courts 
the power to extend their writ extraterritorially so 
as to compel a personal appearance before them.  
Once the defendant is before the court, it matters 
little, from the point of view of procedural due 
process, that he has become subject to the court’s 
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ultimate judgment as a result of territorial or 
extraterritorial process.  Looked at from this 
standpoint, the issue is not one of territorial in 
personam jurisdiction— that has already been 
answered by the statutes--but of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  It is merely an aspect of the basic 
pendent jurisdiction problem.  In United Mine 
Workers v. Gibbs, [383 U.S. 715 (1966)], the 
Supreme Court recognized that a discretionary 
approach should be taken in considering whether 
to entertain pendent claims.  Justification for 
entertaining such claims “. . . lies in 
considerations of judicial economy, convenience, 
and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a 
federal court should hesitate to exercise 
jurisdiction over state claims . . . .”  [383 U.S. at 
726].  Moreover, while the issue of power to 
entertain a suit for an in personam judgment on a 
pendent state law claim will ordinarily be 
resolved on the pleadings, the court remains free 
throughout the proceedings to dismiss such a 
claim if that seems the fairer course.  [Id. at 727.] 
 In this case, recognizing that Cabot was properly 
before it by virtue of extraterritorial service 
authorized by two federal statutes, the district 
court properly weighed considerations of judicial 
economy, convenience and fairness, and 
concluded that it would entertain the pendent 
claims.  That course was within its power and the 
district court will also have power to dismiss the 
pendent claims in the future as noted above. 
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Id. at 555-56.  Acknowledging that the supplemental jurisdiction 
statute codified Gibbs, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Fourth Circuit 
applied this approach to RICO and related state law claims.  See 
ESAB Grp., 126 F.3d at 627-29.   
 
 While they argue in passing that the District Court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction over the Pennsylvania state law 
claims in the absence of the RICO claims, the Isken Defendants 
do not dispute that the state law claims “are so related to” the 
claims under RICO “that they form part of the same case or 
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 
 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  Furthermore, they do not suggest that the 
District Court would decline to exercise its jurisdiction over 
these claims pursuant to the factors set by Gibbs and 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(b).  In fact, the District Court denied the various motions 
to dismiss the RICO claims under Rule 12(b)(6).  See § 
1367(c)(3) (“the district court has dismissed all claims over 
which it has original jurisdiction”).  “Since the court has 
personal jurisdiction over the defendants under service of 
process authorized by the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
[4(k)(1)(C)] and by the RICO statute, we can find no 
constitutional bar to requiring the defendants to defend the 
entire constitutional case, which includes both federal and state 
claims arising from the same nucleus of facts.”  ESAB Grp., 126 




For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the order 
entered by the District Court disposing of the parties’ dismissal 
motions to the extent that it granted the Isken Defendants’ 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 
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12(b)(2) as well as the District Court’s Rule 54(b) order insofar 
as it designated this prior order as the final judgment as to the 
Isken Defendants.  This matter will be remanded to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.   
 
